If you read the international
press, it is easy to be convinced that the international "debate" about global
warming is about whether international organizations and country governments
are able to "wake up" to alarming news about the future of the planet and whether
they are able to pull the reins on corporations seeking short-term profits and
on citizenry enjoying high consumption before calamity strikes us all in a
common threat to humanity.
But if you actually read between
the lines of the analyses done by the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate
Change (the IPCC) that is presented mostly by geographic regions, and look at
climate change from the perspective of military and national security planners
of the major powers, on a country by country basis, there is a very different
story line that reveals the "common threat" and "common interest" claims to be
a smokescreen for a very different reality.
It is a convenient truth among the major powers that despite the
potential costs to millions of people around the globe and the risks to
biological diversity, most of the leaders and elites of countries of the
"North" actually have everything to gain from global warming. In terms of maintaining their power and
keeping the poor of the planet vulnerable, weak, and in turmoil, climate change
is in their interest for at least the next few generations. They are likely already very "awake" to this
reality. They just aren't willing to say
it aloud.
Though there isn't absolute
agreement on all of the impacts of global warming, we took the best evidence
available for impacts on agriculture, on trade routes, on flood damage, on
migration, on mineral and resource extraction (as impacted by climate), and on
health and disease – the factors that most experts are using to determine the
impacts of climate change – and applied our experience working with foreign
ministries, Parliaments, and other government actors, on how they assess their
"national interest" and their overall strategies to determine what it is country
leaders are probably sharing with each other in setting their strategies. We put this information into a simple matrix
of various benefits, costs, and relative strategic and security impact for
major countries of the world, in addition to various regions (see the comparative analysis table
below).
What we found is something that is
so "convenient" and easy to see that we wondered why few others had been saying
it this way. In a world divided by
the wealthy countries of the "North" and the poor countries of the global "South,"
climate change is going to make the "North" warmer and richer and the "South"
poorer in a way that only reinforces the current imbalances of power. This isn't a globally shared problem but a
continuation of inequity. Despite their
protestations of how they are trying to "solve" the "global" problem, many
country leaders actually want global warming.
The biggest winner from global
warming is going to be Russia,
turning its frozen north into arable land and lowering the cost of resource
extraction while also opening up new sea lanes for trade through the North
Pole. This is one of the reasons why Russia
has been so comparatively silent on this debate. Canada is also going to benefit in
a similar way.
China is also going to
benefit. Even though tens of millions of
Chinese may be displaced from the southern part of the country, there will be
benefits to the north. While some of China's neighbors may also be stronger,
including Russia and smaller
countries like Kazakstan, its populous neighbors in Southeast Asia and India will face greater crises that should allow
China
to expand its power. As China emerges
as a richer country of the "North" through its economic planning, its geography
as a northern country only accentuates the trend.
On balance, the other major
powers, the U.S., Europe and
Japan
will have some dislocations of population and industries, but the overall costs
will likely wash out, and the devastation of many of their former colonies and
weak trading partners will help to maintain their power.
The biggest losers from climate
change, in every way, are the same peoples who are always at risk; Africa,
Latin America, Southeast Asia, India, and the Pacific Islands. It is here where millions of peoples will be
flooded from their homes and lose their livelihoods. Minority cultures and indigenous peoples will
be hit hard, forcing assimilation and possibly extermination of cultures; requiring
a rapid and distorting change if they are to physically survive.
Given that most of the major
powers have likely done their own calculations, why are they not available
publicly and why the apparent concern and the rhetoric about climate change as
a shared global problem? Perhaps it is
no accident that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and IPCC offices have asked countries to do analyses of impacts on
their own countries by themselves and have not sought to collect and publicize
these country analyses.
Rather than promote legal
solutions where affected countries could seek legal compensation from major
powers for real compensation of the harms caused to them by climate change
while major powers benefit, it seems as if the major powers have co-opted the
dialogue in an attempt to buy off the losers with a scheme that they can
control, that also hides the calculations of the costs and benefits.
Rather than take the approach
that a court would take, measuring the benefits and losses of different parties
and then redistributing them so that everyone remains whole, the approach of
the international community is one of "carbon trading" that sends some
compensation to poor countries in ways that slow the changes by charging the
countries that release more greenhouse gases.
But given the overall benefits that will accrue to the countries in the
North relative to the South, it appears as if they are really buying off
oversight of the changing distributions and paying only a small percentage of
the benefits that they are accruing, while leaving poor countries both
relatively and absolutely worse off.
Poorer countries will receive payments to help soak up greenhouse gases,
but these payments are not in any way related to the specific harms that they
as countries or the cultural groups or individuals in any countries will
suffer. The international community
seems to want it that way.
Meanwhile, it seems a safe bet to assure that the
countries benefiting economically from global warming will also use their
increased revenues to increase their military spending, to control national and
international security threats. With
climate change certain to lead to instability within countries and between
them, there will be an argument for legitimizing increased military
interventions that will (at least for a time) reinforce current imbalances of
power between north and south (CNA, 2007).
The movements towards "Greening" of industrial countries
are also being conducted behind a smokescreen.
The real motive for greening of industries is driven by economics – the
costs of accessing and controlling resources – and of pollution in those
countries, without little global concern for the overall planetary
environment. This is also why most
economists are happy to cling to models that show how pollution and environmental
problems can be overcome by increasing wealth.
From the perspective of northern industrial countries their increasing
wealth and cleanliness of their local environments will continue to increase at
the expense of the world's poor like other development that has not accounted
for the environmental and other costs that have been transferred to the poor.
The changes are all too
convenient for some.
For others, in the developing
world, who will have to deal with these truths, there are other take home
points. Most important is that the "global"
effort to fight global warming can be recognized by the world's poor for what
it is and isn't. It isn't evidence of a
new concern among wealthy countries for a common destiny of the planet and for
the world's poor. The major powers are
not the "friends" of poor countries on this initiative. Similarly, China,
while claiming to be one of several poor countries whose per capita consumption
should be allowed to increase to that of other major powers, is not promoting
this interest on behalf of all of the world's poor, since this change is likely
to be to China's
benefit and at their expense.
Sale
of resources by poor countries to seek to quickly increase their relative
position – such as oil sales by Cambodia
or Azerbaijan
– will likely worsen their overall position in the long run by promoting the
environmental changes that will help to impoverish their peoples. Similarly, attempts to quickly modernize and
increase consumption in developing countries other than China will help
to reinforce the global changes that will keep developing countries poor and
weak while also destroying their cultures.
The best strategy for
"developing" countries is to try to put aside regional differences now and to
collectivize as alternative power centers and power blocs against the major
powers given that planetary change is only going to make their situations
worse. Any consumption that is frittered
away for weapons and conflicts against each other, rather than in seeking
balance against the "North" will speed their disempowerment, particularly in
Latin America, Southeast Europe, Africa, and the Pacific Islands. The world's native peoples must continue to
organize and assert their powers as a bloc for the enforcement of international
law, since they are at an accelerated risk of disappearing as a result of
climate change. It is also in the
interest of "developing" countries to seek to maintain their traditional
systems and keep their patterns of consumption low as a way to slow global
warming and their vulnerability to it, while at the same time investing
whatever they can (unfortunately) in the technologies of defense and power that
they can use to force change in the developed countries.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS TABLE
"Real" Economic and Political Impact of Climate Change (Global
Warming) on Major Countries and Regions (from the Perspective of Leaders, not
from Populations bearing the impacts of change)
|
Country
|
Positive Economic Impact: Agricultural or Other Benefit of Warming
($ to $$$)
|
Negative Economic Impact: Losses from Coastal Flooding, Refugees1, Health Epidemics, Desertification, Trade Costs
( to )
|
Strategic Impact on Neighbors and Relative International and Regional Power
 - Favorable
 - Unfavorable
 - Not Relevant
|
Overall Impact:
 - Favorable
 - Unfavorable
 - Not Relevant
|
|
Major Powers of the "North"
|
$ - Improved agricultural productivity, overall
$ - Greater access to resources in northern areas
|
 - Some costs in coastal areas, internal dislocations
|
 - Weakening of the Countries of the South
 - Some internal shifts in relative balance of power, but capital mobility might outweigh it
|
 - Slightly advantageous
|
|
United States
|
$ - Opening of trade routes (Northwest sea passage)
$ - Alaskan oil, gas, minerals, timber, tourism more accessible
|
- More funding for sea walls
- Increased droughts in some areas
- Costs to Latin America could make
- Slightly more immigration from Mexico
 - No greater trade transport costs
|
- Weakening of Mexico, Cuba and Latin America will keep them under U.S. influence
 - Enrichment of Canada won't threaten the U.S.
|
- Slightly advantageous
|
|
Russia
|
$$$ - Siberian and Arctic natural resources, i.e. oil, gas, timber, coals, metals more exploitable
$ - Opening of Arctic Northeast trade route
$ - Longer growth seasons in its Far East farm land boosts agriculture
|
- Thawing permafrost causes damage or loss of infrastructure, esp. in Northern Russia and Siberia, exacerbated by projected increases in precipitation levels
|
- Strengthening of China
- No greater threat from Europe or other neighbors
|
- Very advantageous
|
|
Western Europe
|
$ - More agricultural productivity in the north
|
- Less agricultural productivity in the south
- Immigration2: possible solution to negative demography (Halden, 2007)
|
- Stronger Russia
- Weakening of Africa and Middle East will keep them under European influence
- Mixed impact on Eastern Europe
|
- Not a Concern other than between nations or regions in Europe (with most of the negative impacts on weaker powers like Greece, Italy, and Southeastern Europe, and strengthening of the already stronger)
|
|
Northern Europe (U.K., Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Holland) (Bresser et al. 2005)
|
$ - Longer growth seasons increase in agricultural productivity/ crop yields (IPCC, 2007, page 554-5)
$ - Fewer cold deaths (probably outweighing heat deaths) (Keatinge, 2000)
$ - Tourism and outdoor recreation
$ - Decrease in space heating needs (energy) (IPCC, 2007, page 556)
$ - Opening of Arctic Northeast trade route
|
- Increased costs for sea protection but mostly just in Holland
|
Possible market opportunities for agricultural produce to a weakened Southern Europe
|
- Favorable
|
|
Continental Powers (France, Germany, Spain)
|
$ - Minor
|
- Minor
|
-
|
- Not Relevant
|
|
China
|
$ - More agricultural productivity in the north
|
- Less agricultural productivity in the south
- Import costs and stability of resources as demand increases from Africa, could rise
- Possible increase in diseases like SARS, bird flu coming from warming Southeast Asia
- Trade costs might rise but no new competition for exports
|
- Weakening of India, Vietnam, Taiwan, making exploitation easier
- Strengthening of Russia, Kazakstan
- Mongolia will be warmer but land isn't really arable
|
- Favorable for expansion as a world power despite some increased costs to the population
|
|
Japan
|
$ - Opening of northeast sea passage to the Americas
|
- Sea level rise (2M-15M inhabitants impacted by costs to protect power plants and energy conversion facilities)
- No impact on fishing
|
- Stronger China and Russia, Korea
- Weaker trading partners in Southeast Asia
- Not Relevant
|
- Not Relevant
|
|
Canada
|
$$ - Opening of trade routes (Northwest sea passage) and Pacific Trade routes Northwest Passage
$ - Oil, gas, minerals, timber, more accessible (inland and seabed exploitation)
$ - Tourism increase from U.S.
$ - Possible northern extension of farming (small) (Halden, 2007)
|
- Not Relevant
|
- Stronger position relative to U.S.
- Weakening of Mexico, Cuba and Latin America
- Strengthening of Russia and competition over Polar Region
|
- Favorable
|
|
Areas of the South
|
$ - Some countries will have slight agricultural gains from greater rains
|
- Decreased precipitation (more water-stressed countries) cause increased droughts in most countries, with more flooding in coastal southern countries
|
- Strengthening of the Countries of the North
|
- Internal losses magnify instabilities and conflicts and threaten some native groups' existence
|
|
India
|
$ - Benefits to agriculture in some areas
|
- Internal dislocations and costs from flooding and droughts in some areas
- In-migrations from Bangladesh
|
- Weaker Southeast Asian countries
- Stronger China
- No clear impact on Pakistan
|
 - Economic and political costs
|
|
Arab Countries
|
- No increased rain to desert areas
|
- Increased droughts weaken agriculture
- No major impact on export of oil
|
- No change in existing imbalance of powers, though some internal dislocations between agriculture and export sectors
|
- Some losses to agriculture
|
|
Africa
|
$ - Some countries will have slight agricultural gains from greater rains
|
- Decreased precipitation (more water-stressed countries) cause increased droughts in most countries, with more flooding in coastal southern countries
|
- Weakening relative to Europe, China and the Middle East
|
- Internal losses magnify instabilities and conflicts and threaten some native groups' existence
|
|
Latin America
|
- No real benefit to the highlands despite some greater flow of water
|
- Internal dislocations and costs from flooding and droughts in some areas
- Some loss of tourism on islands and lowlands
- No strong impact on fishing or trade
|
- Weakening relative to U.S. and Canada
|
- Internal losses magnify instabilities and conflicts and threaten some native groups' existence
|
|
Southeast Asia
|
- No real benefit to the highlands
|
- Internal dislocations and costs from flooding and droughts in some areas
- Not Relevant
|
- Strengthened China, Kazakstan, and Korea. India is impacted but better able to withstand shocks than smaller countries
- No real change in relations with Japan, Pacific islands.
|
- Internal losses magnify instabilities and conflicts and threaten some native groups' existence
|
|
Pacific Islands (not including Australia and New Zealand)
|
- No real benefit to the highlands
|
- Rising sea levels submerge islands and reduce lands
- Loss of tourist income
- No strong impact on fishing or trade
|
- No change in existing imbalance of powers
|
- Loss of land threaten some nations and native groups' existence
|
1 Including both
Climate Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
2 Immigration flows
caused by climate change should not be regarded as seriously problematic for
Western countries simply because migrations caused by climatic reasons will
possibly be geographically restricted, e.g. restrained within national
boundaries and/or adjacent countries. The great majority of people who are
forced to leave their home, regardless of reason, stay in their countries of
origin or go to neighboring countries whereas only fewer relocate further away
(Myer and Kent; 1995 and Myer 2001). Statistics all support this observation
(UNHCR 2007: 15 & 16).
References
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Van Minnen, J.G., and Witmer, M.C.H., (2005). The Effects of Climate Change
in the Netherlands. Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency.
CNA Analysis and
Solutions. (2007). National Security and The Threat of Climate Change
Halden, P.
(2007). The Geopolitics of Climate Change: Challenges to the International System. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm.
Inter-Governmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2007). IPCC Fourth Assessment Report – Climate
Change 2007: Working Group II Report "Impacts, Adaptation, Vulnerability".
Keatinge, W.R.,
Donaldson, G.C., Elvira Cordioli, Martinelli, M., Kunst, A.E., Mackenbach,
J.P., Nayha, S., and Vuori, I. (2000).
Heat
Related Mortality in Warm and Cold Regions of Europe: Obervational Study. BMJ 2000 321: 670-673
Moscow News. (2008).
Russia Sees Arctic as Key to Security. Moscow News (2008/09/19) Number 37 (2008).
Myers, N. and
Kent, J. (1995).
Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena, The Climate Institute, Washington, DC.
Myers, N. (2001),
Environmental Refugees: Our Latest Understanding, Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: 356: 16.1-16.5.
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