New Introduction, November 2014
I am happy to accept the invitation to re-publish this article for at least three reasons. First, its importance has been discovered by an economist, Professor William Gissy, who, in “Do Merger Restrictions Promote Social Development?” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3 No. 19; November 2013, makes good use of my work and states: “As Gorga notes, since the time of Aristotle economic justice was divided into distributive and commutative components where the latter represents the rules of justice applied to the exchange of goods. Gorga’s key contribution was to recognize the need for a third component, namely participatory justice.” It does not happen every day that one is privileged to add something to Aristotle; this was the major thrust of the article.
Second, I have myself been given time and the opportunity to discover the importance of this article. The reader will see that in the original publication the addition of participative justice was considered as making explicit what was implicit in Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and all Doctors of the Church. In other words, not much of an endeavor.
Then on October 4, 2014, it hit me like a ton of brick. No, this is not a minor addition. Aristotle could not conceive of participative justice. To do so, he would have had to overcome the control that slavery had on the Greeks’ lives—and their conception of leisure. They could not conceive of participative justice because they would have had to extend the blessings of justice to all, slaves included. Obviously, Aristotle did not and could not do that. (To realize why Saint Thomas Aquinas and all Doctors of the Church equally did not and could not conceive of economic justice for all is a much more complex issue).
Not even Jefferson, two thousand years after Aristotle could do that. In 1776, he could not extend the blessings of justice to all human beings, because he could not have preserved the union at the same time. He had to literally cross the word “property” from the Declaration of Independence. Thus he broke with Tradition—and pressed us toward the lala-land of “happiness.” This is a land of entitlements. This is a land of rights and no responsibilities.
That Jefferson could not extend the recognition of economic justice to all becomes painfully evident in the context of the sacrifice of Abraham Lincoln. President Lincoln did extend justice to the slaves and paid for this courageous act with his life. The American people extended justice to the slaves and an estimated 60,000 of them—of us—paid for this courageous act with their limbs; over 600,000 of them—of us—paid for this courageous act with their lives.
With the assistance of a rigorous analysis of a long sweep of history by
Daniel Rush Finn, the central legal dilemma of our age can be identified as follows:
We either redefine property rights or we define economic rights. This essay attempts
to define economic rights.
Currently, the terms economic rights, property rights, and entitlements are treated
as nearly interchangeable synonyms. We will see that these entities are, in fact,
connected to one another by many subtle links of timing sequence and by
many overlapping intellectual conditions determining their respective identities.
In the process, distinctions will emerge that separate these three entities from
each other and firmly implant economic rights within the structure the theory of justice.
From a practical point of view, the judgment that economic rights are neither
entitlements nor the same entity as property rights leads realization. Since no
accepted definition of economic rights theory, there is no rationale for the exercise of
economic rights. There is observable evidence of access to economic resources, but,
clearly, the fact of access is not the same as the right of access.
The task of defining economic rights assumes these rights occupy a pivotal position in an integrated system of social thought. They can be conceived not only as the focal point of economic theory, but they can be construed as the keystone in the arch of economic justice. To anticipate the conclusion of this only those who exercise economic rights can be said and self-reliance.
Toward the Definition of Economic Rights
To clarify issues concerning the definition of economic rights, it might be
useful to begin with an overview of three factual distinctions between economic
rights, property rights, and entitlements. These distinctions can be taken as facts at this stage of the discussion but they will be justified in the course of the argument. First, the content of these three entities is different. The object of property rights are marketable things, tangible or intangible things such as material
goods and services. The object of entitlements are human needs, from food
to shelter to health. The object of economic rights are economic needs.
Second, the legal form of these three entities is different. Property rights are
concrete legal titles over existing wealth; economic rights are
abstract legal claims over future wealth; and entitlements are moral
claims on wealth that legally belong to others.
Finally, the quantity that they measure is variable. While both property rights
and entitlements relate to existing wealth, and therefore a necessarily finite
quantity, economic rights relate to future wealth, an unknown and elastic—if
not a potentially infinite—quantity.
Economic rights can be defined as follows: Economic rights are rights of access to
resources—such as land, labor, physical, and financial capital—that are essential for the creation, legal appropriation, and market exchange of goods and services. Economic rights are self-evident. However,
for their full recognition, economic rights require at least three conditions:
(1) they require a knowledge of basic economic needs for a person to operate in the economic world;
(2) they require a knowledge of their legal characteristics; and (3) they have
to be fully integrated into the theory of justice. This essay attempts to articulate a
framework that satisfies these three conditions.
Basic Economic Needs
The basic economic needs of any human being extend over one or more functions that are related to the creation, legal appropriation, of goods and services. These needs have traditionally been satisfied
through access to labor and land, which also includes natural resources. In the
modern world, one must include access to physical as well as financial capital
among the prerequisites of an independent and economic life.
There is no economic activity that does not land, and natural
resources to be carried out. No poet or let alone an industrialist, can
perform any function without access to these resources. Furthermore, once
money is seen as a means of exchange, it will be conceived to include all forms
of wealth, whether physical or financial wealth. Then it can be seen how,
even in a condition of barter, money is essential to carrying market function.
And equally essential to carrying out any economic function today is access to
physical capital, whether it is a pen, a computer, or a shovel. In previous times,
poets may have subsisted on berries and may have
been able to produce their own papyrus on which to scratch their poems. Today,
we have restricted our own capabilities through the acquisition of specialized knowledge and so, in
order to function properly in the economic sphere, we need access to physical
capital that is generally owned by others. To put it restrictively, access to labor,
land, natural resources, financial, and physical capital is essential to the performance
of any economic function—whether it is production, legal appropriation,
or market exchange of wealth. Indeed, access to these resources is essential
to the very existence of human life.
This is generally well-known. What is not known—and, if known, not readily
granted—is the legal fact that only productive people acquire by
right the title to marketable products and services, a title that is independent of other people’s
will. And what is openly disputed is the claim that only productive people have
the legal as well as the practical means to exchange goods and services in the market. The great tension that exists in the field of entitlements is the attempt to overthrow these basic legal and economic realities.
In accordance with these complex practical and theoretical conditions, four economic rights can be isolated from other potential rights, which must be placed at the foundation of a modern economic policy that is concerned with the production, legal acquisition, and exchange of marketable goods and services.
These four rights are formulated in correspondence with the factors of production of classical economic analysis; namely, land, labor, and capital— with capital being specified in both its financial and physical aspects. These
rights belong to each human being, and can be expressed in these
- The right of access to land and natural resources
- The right of access to national credit
- The right to own the fruits of one’s labor
- The right to protect one’s wealth
This system of rights can be subdivided in a variety of ways. To be established
singly and jointly, these rights have to be justified on many grounds. In some of
my earlier work, readers can find the contours of the economic, moral rationale for these rights.
Our primary focus here has to do with the grounds of these rights.
Some Legal Characteristics of Economic Rights
Economic rights are rights of creation, legal appropriation. In
order to obtain a more precise understanding of this definition, the legal characteristics
of economic rights can be pinpointed as follows.
Economic Rights Distinct From Property Rights and Entitlements
Economic rights can be clearly distinguished from property rights, once it
has been acknowledged that economic rights are the necessary precondition for the creation and the legal establishment of property rights and entitlements.
Property rights cannot be identified with economic rights. Property rights are
the bundle of dominion rights over existing goods and services that are demanded
for the fulfillment of human needs. Economic rights, on the other
hand, are rights of access to resources that are needed to create future goods
and services. This differentiation is transparent when economic resources are
not owned by anyone at the time they are energized to serve in the production
process. For instance, in the process of creating consumer goods, one can fish
or hunt for animals that are still held in the commons, and the only legal tool
that one needs is the right of access to those resources. Moreover,
one can make use of a financial resource such as credit—an entity that manifests itself as the power to create money not exclusively by a government agency but by
private parties as well. Indeed, by looking deeper into the subject it becomes
evident that the power to create money belongs to the people exclusively, and
the role of government agencies is confined to administering that function
properly. The differentiation between economic rights and property rights holds
even when resources are owned by someone else at the time they are acquired
and energized to serve in the production process. The bundle of legal prerequisites
involved in accessing those resources constitutes the set of economic rights.
Thus, the process of creating new wealth, of legally acquiring ownership or transferring
ownership of wealth, involves the exercise of economic rights. Ownership
of specific items of wealth involves the exercise of property rights. Property
rights are static; economic rights are dynamic. Property rights stocks of
wealth; economic rights involve flows of wealth.
Entitlements must be distinguished from economic rights. Entitlements transfer
the possession of specific property (e.g., money or things) and property rights
from one person to another—forcibly, if necessary, under penalty of retribution
from an agency of the state. An example of this power is exercised by the Internal
Revenue Service. Entitlements relate to existing wealth.
Both property rights and entitlements a clear market value and are social to the extent that if society not exist but would not be necessary to human Property rights and entitlements are social and while economic rights are
inalienable. Since economic rights are inextricably linked to the basic requirements
of life, they accompany the very existence of life; and unless one wants to
live the life of enslavement—a condition that is not legally permissible in a civilized society—they are also not alienable. Succinctly put, provided economic
rights are in vigorous existence, the denial of an entitlement or a property right
would not necessarily imply a denial of the right to life. With due qualifications,
singly and jointly, the denial of the right of access to land and natural
resources, the denial of the right of access to national credit, the denial of the
right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labor, and the denial of the right to protect
one’s property, essentially amounts to a denial of the rights to life and liberty,
and certainly to the denial of civilized life and liberty.
The major differences between economic rights, property rights, and entitlements
can be summarized this way: Economic rights represent a legal claim on
potential property rights; property rights represent a legal claim on wealth that is
already in existence; and entitlements represent a moral claim on wealth that is
legally owned by others.
The Differentiation Between Private Rights and Public (or Constitutional) Rights
The proposed set of economic rights offers the interesting theoretical possibility
of establishing the category of public rights within the theory of justice.
For some reason, the category of public rights does not exist in any of the texts
or the standard reference books of Anglo-Saxon legal literature. Therefore, it
seems that in order to realize this possibility, we need to go back to Immanuel Kant’s
Philosophy of Law,  where the foundation for the distinction between
public and private rights is clearly defined. However, it is important to realize
that Kant left the category of public rights as an empty set. He concluded analysis by
stating that “… the Matter of Private Right is, in short, the very
same in both”—namely, in the “sphere of PRIVATE RIGHT” as in the “sphere of
The acceptance of economic rights would give content to the category of
public rights, and would help to differentiate between public and private rights
within the field of economic justice. This differentiation would be useful not only in establishing continuity of thought with where most public rights are fully recognized. the category of public rights would consist in clearly distinguishing property rights from economic rights. Property rights would be categorized as private
rights and economic rights as public If the category of public rights unacceptable for some reason, rights.
Another Difference Between Property Rights and Economic Rights
If the distinction between private and public (or constitutional) rights is accepted, one can further clarify the essential differences that exist between property rights and economic rights. By confining property rights to the category of private rights and assigning economic rights to the category of public (or constitutional)
rights, one could clearly see that property rights regarding a specific item of wealth belong to us
exclusively on either a personal or an individual basis. Economic rights, instead, are those that belong to everyone on a universal basis.
To eliminate a potential source of confusion, it is necessary to classify the
right to ownership in general as an ancillary economic right and therefore as a
public right—a right belonging to everyone. While the right of ownership over
a specific piece of property would always be classified as a property right and
therefore as a private right, economic rights, instead, would belong exclusively
to the category of public (or constitutional) rights.
These are not simply intellectual distinctions. They have
a solid foundation in fact. While property rights restrict other peoples’ freedom, because they necessarily
exclude people from using specific pieces of property, economic rights
enlarge the range of freedom for everyone. Economic rights are similar to voting
rights. Voting rights do not restrict the freedom of anyone; rather, they enlarge
the range of freedom of everyone.
The Differentiation Between Rights in Posse and Rights in Esse
Public (or constitutional) rights are potentialities; they are rights in posse.
For example, the right to vote is a potential right and not the actual act of
voting. Public (or constitutional) rights are recognized by the community on
behalf of all its citizens. Private rights, on the other hand, are granted by
the community to individual persons exclusively. Thus, economic rights are rights
in posse and property rights are rights in esse.
In these theoretical questions, the issue of the practical usefulness of economic
rights is embedded. Succinctly stated, their usefulness that they represent a
legal claim on future property rights. In other words, economic
rights, as many other rights, represent legal potentialities. To distinguish
them from other rights, these potentialities perform a specific function.
They represent opportunities to create wealth. Thus, their exercise allows
people to exist in the economic sphere with full dignity Since, by
nature, economic rights are universal they represent a fair distribution opportunities to create future
Rights and Responsibilities
From Giuseppe Mazzini to Oliver Wendell Holmes, it has been recognized
that the very essence of rights is that they imply responsibilities. There
are various reasons for the existence of an indissoluble link between these two
entities. The first reason can be found in the very nature of rights observed in
the full glory of social and communal relations. If rights are innate, they belong
to all human beings universally. Therefore, since the community does not possess them, when it assigns them to each individual person—i.e., when their title is conferred by
society—the community must request a quid pro quo
as compensation for all other people. The quid is the responsibility. It is the
assignment of responsibilities that, given community relationships, provides
legal legitimacy to the assignment of rights.
Then there is the issue of moral legitimacy. Society cannot give rights away
without simultaneously assigning responsibilities. Responsibilities, so understood,
confer moral justification for rights. One justification for this linkage
can be found in the domain of political science. David E. Stephens, a moral
theologian, once suggested the following to me in a letter: “If one has responsibilities
but no corresponding rights, then one is bound by and a victim of necessity—
in the form of some kind of tyranny. If one has rights and no
corresponding responsibilities, then one is unaccountably free, a state of anarchy.”
He went on to make an important philosophical argument: “Yet, in both
cases the linkage between right and responsibility is inescapable: If one is bound
by necessity, either one has a responsibility to conform to necessity or to suffer
the alternative sanctions. If one is unaccountably free, then either one is self-
accountable or self-destructive. Barring destruction of the party or parties in
either state, some responsibility or some rights must coordinate with the state of necessity or freedom. Between these polar states, a full spectrum of proportionality
of coordinated rights and responsibilities are to be
A society that wants to be civilized must link people together through a set
of mutual rights and responsibilities. Human relationships then become legal because they are moral, and they are moral because perspective, responsibilities are the quid pro quo that diminishes the reasons
for society to ever take rights away from individual human beings, and thus
binds society to the individual person. From responsibilities
represent what is given back to society, and thus bind the individual person society. In either case, responsibilities provide the moral justification for rights.
If the right balance is found, the but he also ensures stability Members of society will not
desire to alter those relationships.
Corresponding Economic Responsibilities
Responsibilities cannot be superimposed upon rights arbitrarily. Rather, they are an inherent part of them, and are time- and place-specific. If the rights are conceptual, then the responsibilities must be conceptual. Yet, as soon as the exercise of rights becomes concrete, their inherent obligations become legal obligations—obligations, that is, enforceable in a court of law.
All too briefly, since the arguments belong mostly to the field of economic
analysis and economic policy, the responsibilities that one might want to associate
with the four economic rights enunciated above can be pinpointed as
follows. In correspondence with the right of access to natural resources, there ought to be
the duty to pay taxes for the use of those resources. The basic rationale for this duty is not only that natural resources are a common good and the good of all requires that they be equitably shared, but that the payment of taxes is a token compensation for the exclusion of others from the use of those resources. Furthermore, the rationale is that much—but by no means all—of
the value of one’s property derives from communal efforts (e.g., the provision
of water, sewer, and electric lines; schools, theaters, and museums). The rationale
is also that by paying taxes on land and natural resources one eliminates
the incentive to hoard those resources and thus, with full compensation, one
makes the resources that are hoarded potentially part of the commonwealth
through voluntary market exchanges. The alternative is clear: One can hold on to
the land but one must pay taxes on those holdings. Taxes on land and natural
resources cannot be construed as “takings.” Quite simply, they represent payment
for the provision of public services received directly by the owner of the land. The extent to which taxes on land and natural resources should the value of the public goods received can be ascribed to payment for the social
and economic benefits of the absence of hoarding.
In correspondence with the right of access to national credit be the duty to repay the loan.
The exercise of this right should be subjected to the
following restrictions: (1) Access should be limited to capital credit to create
new wealth (consumer credit, credit for paper transactions, as well as credit for
transfer of ownership titles would not qualify); (2) It should be issued to benefit
all participants in the enterprise; and (3) rationale for the basic duty to repay the loan is that national credit is a common good. Failure to repay the loan causes the pool of common drained. Worse yet, due to inflationary effects, by not repaying the loan one debases the currency to the detriment the abuser of the right included.
Corresponding to the third above, the right to own the
fruits of one’s labor, there ought to be the duty to meet the obligations outlined
in the performance of the work. Likewise, corresponding to the right to protect
one’s wealth, there ought to be the duty to respect other people’s wealth.
A brief note regarding the implementation of these duties should be appended
here. As it can be seen from this list, the obligations are not obligations
of the state. If the state does not have economic rights to apportion, it cannot assume economic obligations to fulfill. The obligations flow from individual
human beings to other human beings. The state can only administer
the policies that make for an easy fulfillment of those obligations.
Theory and Practice
The natural mutuality of interests and concerns among human beings makes for an integration of rights and responsibilities. We have seen that this integration
is such an essential part of the theory of economic rights one might conclude
that the link forms an implicit contract. However, does this imply that
the theory is always respected in practice? Since the law does not have
a soul, since it does not have an essence of its own, there is no ultimate justification
in the law for this linkage. The justifications we have found occur in the domain
of morality, sociology, politics, and philosophy, but not in the law.
The law is a tool, in fact, a neutral tool of society. In the end, the law can accomplish
anything society wants it to accomplish. Hence, there is no legal justification
for rights to be tied to responsibilities. Indeed, since rights are social entities,
they are a two-edged sword. Society giveth; society can take away. Society can
only grant privileges. Society cannot grant rights; it can only recognize them.
But society can prevent their exercise.
The link between theory and practice can be dissolved; yet if the link is a
natural one, many problems will arise from its dissolution. Rather than the
administration of universal rights, one shall find the granting of factional privileges.
Rather than the protection of the laws, one shall find a favoritism imposed
by force. Rather than freedom for all, one shall find libertinism for few. Rather than social integration, one shall eventually find social disintegration. Liberty and stability exist only in a regimen laws. For moral, sociological,
and political reasons it is advisable that responsibilities. With such a burden lying on the propriety rights and responsibilities, one must make sure that the theory is
Economic Rights Within the Theory of Justice
We will examine five tests of legal validity that the proposed economic rights
must pass before they can be accepted as true public (or constitutional) rights.
Thereafter, we will see whether they conform with established principles of economic
justice. Finally, we will see what sort of place they might eventually occupy
within the structure of the theory of justice.
Some Theoretical Perspectives
For these rights and responsibilities to be accepted, they must pass a number
of theoretical tests that belong to the legal understanding of justice. First, do the proposed rights and responsibilities yield the essential elements of “the original position” envisioned by
Rawls? Second, do they meet the requirements of the “reverse theory” enunciated by
Nozick? Recognizing that “particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition,” Nozick postulates: “The reverse
theory would place only such universally held general ‘rights to’ achieve goals or to be in a certain material condition into its substructure so as to determine all else; to my
knowledge no serious attempt has been made to state this ‘reverse’ theory.”
A third theoretical test of validity can be construed in relation to the Principle
of Generic Consistency, which has been carefully designed and cogently
argued for by Alan Gewirth. Will the above set of four rights and responsibilities pass this test? Gewirth’s principle to “Act in accord with the generic rights of
your recipients as well as of yourself” is an attempt to synthesize the logical requirements advanced by Rawls with those of Nozick.
There are many other tests of validity. The next that might be considered is
based on the conditions for the existence of a “system of rights” as specified by
Rex Martin. Can those rights function as a system of rights? One final test comes to mind. Are the proposed rights and responsibilities properly within a robust vision of a very traditional Catholic concern, namely,
the common good,” as Finn recommends?
The Principles of Justice
For the proposed economic rights and responsibilities to become
an integral part of the theory of justice they have to be expressions of sound
legal and philosophical principles. The most important test that those four rights
and responsibilities, singly and jointly, have
to sustain is this: Are those rights built on the basis of solid principles? The scrutiny are:
- Each specific right shall make us free (the intellectual, rationalist argument);
- Each specific right shall be universal (the idealist as well as the utilitarian argument);
- Each specific right shall be fair (the emotional, naturalistic, transcendentalist argument);
- Each specific right shall be enforceable in a court of law (the positivist argument);
- Each specific right shall create social order (the political and aesthetic argument).
Only a few questions can be raised here to point toward the necessary analysis that must be done to determine the correspondence of those rights with the above principles: (1) Is each one of those rights intimately related to the question of truth—and hence to freedom in general—as well as to issues of economic
freedom in particular? (2) Is each one of those rights an expression of universality and even of universal utilitarianism? (3) Is each one of those rights related to natural rights theory? (4) Can each right also be justified in terms of positivism? (5) Does each right have the potentiality to contribute to social as
well as intellectual harmony?
A Place Within the Theory of Justice
If the proposed rights and responsibilities pass the specific tests of legal
validity mentioned above and if they pass the theoretical test of concordance
with basic principles of philosophy, in order to become fully accepted, they
have to occupy a specific place within the theory of justice. Is there such a
place for them?
A place for economic rights and responsibilities within the structure of theory of justice will be found only if two requirements are met. First, one must adhere to the ancient division of this body of knowledge into two fields:
political justice and economic justice. With regard to economic justice, we
must add to it a new plank: participative justice.
From Aristotle to the late Middle Ages, and within the Catholic tradition up
to Monsignor Ryan’s work in the twentieth century, the theory of economic
justice was thought to be composed of two major parts, distributive and commutative
justice—with the latter presenting rules of exchange of goods and services. The
right to participate in the production of wealth must have
seemed so natural, so innate in human that no need
was felt to specify it in writing. With closure of the commons,
the full development of a monetary economy, and the propensity to cluster
immense concentrations of wealth in a few hands, the economic conditions of
the world have, indeed, changed. The right participant, rather
than being relegated to the margin of economic life is a right that needs to be asserted.
Implementation of the requirements of participative justice is imperative today.
Taking the lead from the seminal economic policy analysis of Louis O. Kelso,
this addition to the theory of economic justice can be justified from
many points of view. Its moral rationale can be most clearly found in the social
teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. In Centesimus Annus, for instance,
Pope John Paul II calls for a “society of free work, of enterprise and of participation.”
In the preceding paragraph he specifies: “Inseparable from that required ‘something’ (which is due to man because he is man) is the possibility to survive and at the same time to make an active contribution to the common good of humanity.”
Some of the legal rationale for this addition is provided by Nozick with his
principle of “justice in acquisition.” The economic rationale can be found in
the revision of Keynes’ model first envisaged by this writer in the summer of
1965, and gradually developed ever since. This work yields the equivalence of
production to distribution to consumption. In accordance with these results
the test is as follows: Can the proposed system of rights be justified, through a
series of iterations, by the requirements of participative, distributive, and commutative justice?
All too briefly, without the exercise of the proposed four rights, people are
not free to participate in the economic process. They are not put in a position of parity in relation to the apportionment of shares in the process of the distribution
of wealth. If people do not participate in the production process or are
at a disadvantage in the process of the distribution of wealth, then they are
automatically at a disadvantage in the process of the exchange of wealth. It
would be naive to see the latter set of needs as involving only problems of consumerism; one must enlarge the scope to encompass problems and hoarding of wealth. Note Monsignor John A. Ryan’s major work,
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth,
where he builds on the solid tradition of the past but without that are still with us today.
For instance, this work contains a legal and economic
analysis of the minimum wage that is far superior to anything existing in
the current literature on the subject.
In summary, the proposed four economic rights offer complete the structure of the theory The structure can be
built upon three planks: participative justice, distributive justice, and commutative justice. But the three component parts sequentially. As in a physical structure, they operate synchronously, and the
theory becomes a powerful engine of decision and analysis.
There are many indications today that, while public struggles over the last
few centuries were mostly concerned with issues of political justice, the current
struggle is one of economic justice. Foundational to this struggle is the
issue of defining economic rights. This article has sought to define these rights as rights of access to essential resources in the process of production, distribution,
and the exchange of wealth. It is through access to those resources that
one creates property and property rights. By regressing the search of the legal
title of ownership to present wealth, one is led to the realization that this was
the reality in the ancient past as it still is today.
The practical thrust of this essay consists in transforming the fact of access to economic resources into the right of access to economic resources. Rich and poor alike—the rich to an obviously greater degree than the poor—live in a legal regimen that is one of privilege. They acquire access to economic resources as a fact—not as a right. This is the ultimate source of instability in the modern
polity. The fact of access has to be transformed into a universal right. If rich
and poor alike are to live under a regimen of laws, economic rights have
to be defined and exercised universally.
This article has sought to provide an understanding of basic economic needs
that are met by those rights. It has also described an understanding of the legal
characteristics of economic rights. Throughout we have suggested that the theory
of economic justice should be seen as composed of participative justice, distributive
justice, and commutative justice—three planks that have to be treated
not as three sequential segments but as three synchronous parts whose requirements
are either satisfied simultaneously or not at all.
Daniel Rush Finn, “Catholic Social Thought on Property: An Renewal.” Paper presented at the conference on “The Legacy of John A. Ryan,” University of Saint Thomas, 1995.
Carmine Gorga, “The Revised Keynes’ Model,” Atlantic Economic Journal 10 (September 1982): 52; “Bold New Directions in Politics and Economics,” The Humane Economy Newsletter 12 (March 1991): 3–6, 12; “Quality Assurance: Internal ” in Quality Control and Quality Assurance for Seafood, eds. Gilbert Sylvia, Ann L. Shriver, and Michael T. Morrisey (Corvallis, Oreg.: Oregon State University, 1994), 158–63; “Four Economic Rights: Social Renewal Through Economic Justice For All,” Social Justice Review 85 (January/February 1994): 3–6; Carmine Gorga and Norman G. Kurland, “The Productivity Standard: A True Golden Standard,” in Every Worker An Owner: A Revolutionary Free Enterprise Challenge to Marxism, ed. Dawn M. Kurland (Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Social Justice, 1987), 83–6; Carmine Gorga and Stuart B. Weeks, “Fisheries Renewal: A Renewal of the Soul of Business,” The Catholic Social Science Review 2 (1997): 145–62.
Immanuel Kant, “Philosophy of Law,” in The Great Legal Philosophers: Selected Readings in Juris
prudence, ed. Clarence Morris (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959).
Giuseppe Mazzini, The Duties of Man (London: Chapman and Hall, 1862).
Oliver Wendall Holmes, “Uncollected Letters,” in The Wisdom of the Supreme Court, ed. Percival E. Jackson (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), 398.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 12, 72, 136, 538.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 238.
Alan Gewirth, “Economic Justice: Concepts and Criteria,” in Economic Justice: Private Rights and
Public Responsibilities, ed. Kenneth Kipnis and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985).
Rex Martin, Rawls and Rights (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1985), 114–8, 129.
Finn, “Catholic Social Thought on Property.”
Louis O. Kelso and Mortimer Adler, The Capitalist Manifesto (New York: Random House, 1958), chap. 5; Louis O. Kelso and Patricia Hetter, Two–Factor Theory: The Economics of Reality (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 10, 28, 32.
John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus (May 15, 1991), no. 35.
Ibid., no. 34.
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 150ff., esp. 168.
Gorga, “The Revised Keynes’ Model.”
John A. Ryan, Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1942 [orig. 1916]).
Ibid., 249–302. The historic emphasis there is on the living wage.
I would like to acknowledge Professor Michael J. Naughton, who invited me to participate in the conference on “The Legacy of Msgr. John A. Ryan,” University of Saint Thomas, 1995, and Professor Robert G. Kennedy, who exhibited enormous patience with my unexpected delays in completing this article. I have benefited from the constructive criticism of Janis D. Stelluto, David E. Stephens, Stuart B. Weeks, and David S. Wise.
Postcript, November 2014
The following paragraphs attempt to put the present paper in the context of this writer’s work—as well as in the context of current economic analysis. After all, this is the year in which a Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to Professor Jean Tirole “for his analysis of market power and regulation.”
Without being rooted in the Aristotelian tradition, the work “on regulation”—as well as much modern economic theory and policy—seems to be suspended in the air. Indeed, especially economic analysis of government regulations can be better rooted, understood, and practiced if it is linked to the long tradition of the doctrine, and now the theory, of economic justice.
Clearly, there is a need to link the theory of economic justice to economic analysis as a whole. In 2002 I published The Economic Process: An Instantaneous Non-Newtonian Picture (University Press of America); this work was reissued in 2010 in an extended paperback format. In this work, economic theory is defined as the study of the economic process.
The following two figures accomplish the aim of linking policy to theory. The two figures represent the core of Concordian economics. Concordian economics is an integration of economic policy, theory, and practice. Thus:
Concordian economic policy (Fig. 1) presents an integration of the three essential planks of economic justice: the right of every human being to participate in the process of production of real and monetary wealth (participative justice); (in order to obtain) the right to a fair share of what one produces (distributive justice); and the right to receive an equivalent value of what one gives (commutative justice).
Concordian economic theory (Fig. 2) presents the integration of Production of real goods and services; Consumption or expenditure of financial assets to acquire real goods and services; and the Distribution of ownership rights over goods as well as money. In the purchase of a car, for instance, you have an exchange of three items: 1. the car; 2. the money; and 3. the deed of ownership. One cycle of the process is completed when goods pass from producers to consumers; for the exchange to occur—in a civilized way—both producers and consumers must have ownership of what they exchange.
The advantage of presenting these two diagrams back to back is to reveal the inner relationship that exists between them: economic justice is the mirror image of the economic process. One can just as soon separate one from the other as one can separate people from their shadows. The economic process can be separated from economic justice only at great risk and peril.
Concordian economic practice presents an integrated set of rights and responsibilities in relation to the four modern factors of production: the right of access to land and natural resources and the responsibility to pay taxes on that portion of land and natural resources that fall under our exclusive control; the right of access to national credit and the responsibility to repay loans acquired through national credit; the right to the fruits of one’s labor and the responsibility to contribute to the process of creation of wealth; the right to the enjoyment of one’s wealth and the responsibility to respect the wealth of others.
Since they are rooted in responsibilities, these are rights—not privileges. They are unalienable rights. They are essential to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
As I have pointed out in “Somism: Beyond Individualism and Collectivism Toward a World of Peace and Justice,” Concordian economics is inextricably related to the theory and practice of the social man and woman, the civilized person; specifically, as I have stated on numerous occasions: Only civilized people, people truly integrated within themselves and within society can give and receive economic justice. Justice is a virtue. To give and receive economic justice requires love, the highest of theological virtues.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR|
Carmine Gorga is President, The Somist Institute. The mission of the institute is to foster sensible moral leadership. He is a former Fulbright scholar and the recipient of a Council of Europe Scholarship for his dissertation on ”The Political Thought of Louis D. Brandeis.” Using age-old principles of logic and epistemology, in a book and a series of papers Dr. Gorga has transformed the linear world of economic theory into a relational discipline in which everything is related to everything else—internally as well as externally. He was assisted in this endeavor by many people, notably for 27 years by Professor Franco Modigliani, a Nobel laureate in economics at MIT. The resulting work, The Economic Process: An Instantaneous Non-Newtonian Picture, was published in 2002 and reissued in an expanded edition in 2010. For reviews, click here. During the last few years, Dr. Gorga has concentrated his attention on the requirements for the unification of economic theory and policy, calling this unity Concordian Economics.