pelicanweblogo2010

Mother Pelican
A Journal of Solidarity and Sustainability

Vol. 17, No. 12, December 2021
Luis T. Gutiérrez, Editor
Home Page
Front Page

motherpelicanlogo2012


Prolegomena to Christian Environmental Ethics ~ Part 1

Walter Scott Stepanenko

December 2021


21.12.Page11.Ethics.jpg
Art by Alejandro Morassi, in Revista Para Uma Nova Civilização, Creative Commons
Click the image to enlarge


What is the core of Christianity? Settling on an essence of Christianity is no easy matter. Christianity is a diverse tradition, far more diverse than many believe. Consider, for example, the way the Gospel of John treats many important Christian issues, such as the Atonement, compared to the Synoptic Gospels. Even today, many Christians disagree on important issues. Perhaps then Christianity is a family of views, tied together historically, with no truly essential commitments. If this view of Christianity is correct, drafting an outline for a Christian environmental ethic would be complicated, perhaps even impossible. Not everyone would agree on the details. To perhaps unfairly skirt this issue, I want to examine the core of what I will call orthodox Christianity. What is at the core of orthodox Christianity?

As I see it, the core of orthodox Christianity involves such commitments as:

(1) Classical theism is broadly true. God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, immaterial, and the Creator of everything.

(1) seems to entail

(2) Creation ex nihilo. God created the world from nothing. Creation is entirely dependent on God as its constant Sustainer.

Of course, (1) and (2) are not commitments distinct to Christianity. They are shared by the other major monotheistic traditions. What makes orthodox Christianity a distinctive monotheistic tradition is its commitment to:

(3) Incarnation. God became a human being in the person of Christ. However, Christ is not a creature. Rather God is triune.

Of course, it might be possible to add a fourth commitment. Perhaps orthodox Christianity is also committed to something like:

(4) Resurrection. Christ died on the cross and rose from the dead some days later.

I don’t want to deny that (4) belongs to the core of orthodox Christianity or that something like (5) Atonement does, but for brevity’s sake, I will restrict the following discussion to (1), (2), and (3).

What are the ethical implications of these commitments? [1] In my view, (1) suggests that there is non-trivial value in all of Creation. Because God is good, all-powerful, and all-knowing, we can be reasonably confident that God creates something worthwhile. As I see it, (1) puts considerable pressure on the subject-object schematizing of intrinsic value. This is not to say that (1) forces us to reject that schematizing in our approach to general ontology. It may very well be the case that God has created a world where there are subjects and objects. Rather (1) suggests that we cannot divide the world up into what is intrinsically valuable and what is instrumentally valuable and map that division neatly on to the distinction between subjects and objects. This suggests that inanimate objects may be regarded as bearers of intrinsic value in a Christian environmental ethic. Thus, (1) may point toward something like a land ethic, and away from something like sentientism (the view that all and only minded creatures have intrinsic value) and even biocentrism (the view that all and only living things have intrinsic value).

Of course, it could be the case that God as described in (1) created somethings for the sake of other things. Thus, (1) alone might not have such robust implications. However, remember that (1) entails (2) creation ex nihilo. (2) suggests that God freely made the universe, that in a real sense the very existence of the universe is a gift, a work of art [2]. Thus, together (1) and (2) may sit more comfortably with the view that even the land is intrinsically valuable than with views that deny this. However, caution is needed here. When we think of Creation as a gift given by God, it may seem that Creation is valuable only instrumentally, insofar as it is something that God desires. Against this, we should remember that the giver of a gift need not value the gift given. In such cases, it is typically the recipient who values the gift, but even this is not necessarily the case. The exchanging of gifts can be a good in itself even if neither the giver nor the recipient places much value on what is being exchanged.

This point requires some unpacking. To get closer to it, we need to note a distinction between monadic and relational value. Monadic value is the value a thing possesses because of what is inside of it, because of what can be ascribed to it alone. Relational value is the value a thing possesses because of what it is inside of, because of what it relates to. The value of a gift can be determined by considering both forms of value. Oftentimes, gifts are especially valuable because of the monadic value of the gift. However, the point that I am making is that a gift can be valuable because of the very act of exchanging, or giving, a gift. Thus, a gift can be valuable simply because it is a gift, because it creates a relationship between a giver and a recipient.

Now, this last thought might seem to point toward the importance of subjectivity in gift giving but remember that a recipient of a gift need not be conscious of that gift. Thus, Christian tradition has it that God or parents give the gift of life, and this is true even when the child is not aware of their own existence. However, at this point, we should bear in mind that we have only explored the potential ethical implications of (1) and (2). (1) and (2) are at the core of most major monotheistic approaches in general. The task here is to explore the implications of orthodox Christianity. This means we need to bear in mind (3) Incarnation.

In my view, (3) can be thought to support direct moral consideration of the land for the following reasons. First, (3) does not point toward the primacy of subjective awareness. After all, orthodox Christianity maintains that God is a conscious being. So, the emphasis in the Incarnation is not on Christ becoming a conscious being, or a sentient creature, however we cash that out. Second, (3) does not point toward the importance of living things. After all, orthodox Christianity maintains that there is life in God. Rather what (3) points to is the importance of being enfleshed [3]. Therefore, it seems to me that Classical Theism points in the direction of something like a land ethic.

What is a land ethic? What shape might an orthodox Christian approach to a land ethic take? [4] These are subjects worth exploring in future posts.

Notes

[1] In “Which God Should Environmentalists Believe In?” I argued that it is difficult to advocate one model of God simply by examining environmental considerations alone. Here, I work in the opposite direction. I assume the truth of Classical Theism and work toward environmental considerations, as far as might be possible.

[2] “Nature is usually seen as a system which can be studied, understood and controlled, whereas creation can only be understood as a gift from the outstretched hand of the Father of all, and as a reality illuminated by the love which calls us together into universal communion.” Pope Francis, Laudato si’, 24 May 2015, #76.

[3] “our body itself establishes us in a direct relationship with the environment and with other living beings.” Laudato si’, #155.

[4] “In this sense, it is essential to show special care for indigenous communities and their cultural traditions…For them, land is not a commodity but rather a gift from God and from their ancestors who rest there, a sacred space with which they need to interact if they are to maintain their identity and values.” Laudato si’, #146.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Walter Scott Stepanenko is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. His current research focuses on issues that emerge at the intersection of science and theology in philosophy of religion. He received his PhD from the University of Cincinnati where he completed a dissertation on the limits of moral demandingness with attention to the demandingness of the obligations of individual human actors with respect to climate change. He is a former Research Associate at the Center for Religious Understanding at the University of Toledo (Ohio).


|Back to Title|

LINK TO THE CURRENT ISSUE          LINK TO THE HOME PAGE

"The scientifically necessary is politically unfeasible,
the politically feasible is scientifically irrelevant."


William Rees (b. 1943)

GROUP COMMANDS AND WEBSITES

Write to the Editor
Send email to Subscribe
Send email to Unsubscribe
Link to the Google Groups Website
Link to the PelicanWeb Home Page

CREATIVE
COMMONS
LICENSE
Creative Commons License
ISSN 2165-9672

Page 17      

FREE SUBSCRIPTION

[groups_small]

Subscribe to the
Mother Pelican Journal
via the Solidarity-Sustainability Group

Enter your email address: