In this series, we have been exploring animal ethics from a Christian perspective [1], [2]. Many Christians practicing animal ethics adopt a position equivalent or near equivalent to the position many secular animal ethicists adopt, namely, an animal rights position, or as it is sometimes described, the abolitionist perspective on animal ethics, the position that humans should abolish all forms of instrumental use of nonhuman animals. The lacuna in these theories consists of a gap between the argumentative structure of these positions and their prescribed reforms. This gap lies between arguments for sentientism and arguments for egalitarianism. Few theorists recognize this gap, and many conflate the argument for sentientism with an argument for egalitarianism. This leaves these positions inadequately motivated. In this essay, part three of this series, I want to explore one further strategy for bridging this argument. While animal ethicists employing this strategy do a bit more than other ethicists who do not recognize the lacuna between arguments for sentientism and arguments for egalitarianism, I argue that this strategy nonetheless fails and that it ultimately leaves this lacuna unaddressed.
The strategy I have in mind involves a method philosophers call reflective equilibrium, after the political philosopher John Rawls who coined the term. In reflective equilibrium, one begins with a moral conviction that seems to be sound, or what is called a considered judgment. For example, I intuitively react with moral disapprobation when I think of wanton violence. As I reflect on that reaction, it seems to me to be justified. So, when I endorse that reaction upon reflection, that reaction becomes, for me, a considered judgment. I can then go on to inspect other intuitive reactions that I have to moral situations. If I endorse those reactions upon reflection, then they too become considered judgments. With some time and effort, I can then come to appreciate a whole host of considered judgments. Once these are in sight, I can then ask what principles I might be committed to that account for those judgments. When I have identified some principles that account for my considered judgments, I can then ask what these principles would require of me in other circumstances I have yet to consider. If my intuitive reactions to these cases cohere with what my principle prescribe, then my principles remain intact, but if my intuitive reactions to these cases do not cohere with the prescriptions generated by principles and/or they contradict other considered judgments, then, I need to make some revisions. The process of revising my principles, considered judgments, and/or reactions to new cases so that my judgments cohere with my reactions to new and previously considered cases is what the method of reflective equilibrium recommends.
The very capable philosopher Daniel Dombrowski has employed this method in defense of a strong animal rights position [3]. According to Dombrowski, we must reflect on our intuitive reactions to various forms of treatment of human beings. Included in the species of human beings are infants and other people with severe cognitive disabilities. Despite the fact that these humans do not possess the same rational capacities as many adult human beings, we nonetheless consider them our equals. In Dombrowski’s view, this is the right thing to do. So, for Dombrowski, we have judgments that tell in favor of the equality among all human beings, regardless of intellectual capacity. The next question to ask is what principle accounts for this equality? According to Dombrowski, the reason all human beings are equal cannot be “because they are human” [4]. That would not be very informative and in the context of considering whether to directly consider nonhumans in moral decision-making, appeals to humanity and nothing else just beg the question. Thus, Dombrowski suggests a principle is needed that accounts for what all human beings have in common. In his view, what makes all human beings worth considering is sentience. All humans are subjects and for this reason they are worthy of equal consideration. However, when we consider nonhuman animals, it becomes apparent that we do not consider them equal to humans. In Dombrowski’s view, this is an inconsistency that calls for the method of reflective equilibrium. In this situation, we are faced with two options: revise our judgment about so-called “marginal humans” so that we treat them the way we treat nonhuman animals or revise our judgments about nonhumans animals so that we treat them the way we treat “marginal humans.” Dombrowski’s view is that we should opt for the latter route and regard all nonhuman animals as the moral equals of human beings.
Clearly, this is a persuasive strategy, and it has the advantage of at the very least devising something of a method that supports egalitarianism rather than assuming it. The problem with this strategy is that it overlooks the very real possibility that not all nonhuman animals are sentient. If some nonhuman animals are not sentient, Dombrowski’s strategy would suggest that these animals are not intrinsically valuable. From a Christian perspective, that seems wrong. The Christian will have a strong sense that all of creation possesses some value insofar as it was created by God and Scripture, particularly Genesis [5], suggests that God thinks of all of creation as good. Moreover, there is ample philosophical reason to think that any living thing can be helped or hindered insofar as its survival can be either hampered or abetted. Theologically, we might say that every living thing has a telos. From the Christian perspective, this suggests that all lifeforms are intrinsically valuable, and worthy of direct moral consideration. The problem for Dombrowski is that once we recognize this fact, the most plausible principles we could construct to account for our moral judgments will suggest that once we move beyond the realm of human beings, the principle of equal consideration no longer automatically applies. Therefore, the method of reflective equilibrium leaves the lacuna between arguments for sentientism and arguments for egalitarianism in Christian animal ethics unaddressed.
How then should Christians approach animal ethics in particular and environmental ethics in general? This is a topic that requires the sustained efforts of many philosophers and theologians, but there are some preliminary points one can make, and these will follow in the final part of this series next month.
Notes
[1] Stepanenko, Walter Scott. A Lacuna in Christian Animal Ethics ~ Part 1. Mother Pelican Journal, September 2021, p.17.
[2] Stepanenko, Walter Scott. Lacuna in Christian Animal Ethics ~ Part 2. Mother Pelican Journal, October 2021, p.17.
[3] Dombrowski, Daniel. 2008. The Argument from Marginal Cases: A Philosophical and Theological Defense. In Eating and Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology. Edited by David Grummett and Rachel Muers, pp.155-167. New York, NY: T&T Clark.
[4] Ibid., 157.
[5] For example, Genesis 1 describes God repeatedly describing creation as “good.”
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Walter Scott Stepanenko is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. His current research focuses on issues that emerge at the intersection of science and theology in philosophy of religion. He received his PhD from the University of Cincinnati where he completed a dissertation on the limits of moral demandingness with attention to the demandingness of the obligations of individual human actors with respect to climate change. He is a former Research Associate at the Center for Religious Understanding at the University of Toledo (Ohio).
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